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Abstract 
We conducted a field experiment on the Internet and investigated the participants’ belief 
updating in an individual learning environment where they observe a sequence of 
private signals and in a social learning environment where they observe a sequence of 
other people’s actions. We observed that participants do not update their posterior 
beliefs as efficiently as Bayesian, and that participants rely more on private signals than 
on other people’s actions even when the informativeness of both is identical. 
Furthermore, we confirmed that participant’s trust in other people’s actions and their 
conformity to other people’s actions are affected by their demographic characteristics. 
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1. Introduction 
We conducted a field experiment on the Internet and investigated how participants 
update their posterior beliefs on the underlying state of the world in an individual 
learning environment, where they can observe a sequence of private signals, and in a 
social learning environment, where they can observe a sequence of other people’s 
actions. We analyzed whether participants’ belief-updating behaviors are consistent 
with Bayesian theory and whether they differ depending on the learning environment, 
comparing with the results of the previous laboratory experiments on informational 
cascades. In addition, by measuring participant’s degree of trust in other people’s 
actions and their conformity to other people’s actions, we examine whether they are 
affected by participant’s demographic characteristics. 
We observed that participants do not make use of private signals and other people’s 
actions as efficiently as Bayesian theory assumes. We also found that participants report 
higher posterior beliefs in an individual learning environment than in a social learning 
environment, even when the theoretical informativeness of the observed sequence of 
private signals and other people’s actions is identical. In addition, we confirmed that 
participant’s trust in other people’s actions and their conformity to other people’s 
actions are affected by some of their demographic characteristics. 
In the following section, we outline the field experiment and show the framework of 
individual and social learning. In Section 3, we present the behavioral hypotheses 
derived from Bayesian theory. In Section 4, we examine whether participants’ 
belief-updating behaviors are consistent with the behavioral hypothesis and whether 
they differ depending on the learning environment. In Sections 5 and 6, we measure 
participant’s degree of trust in other people’s actions and their conformity to other 
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people’s actions and investigate whether they are affected by their demographic 
characteristics. In Section 7, we conclude the discussion. 
2. Individual and social learning in the field experiment 
The field experiment was conducted from February 23 to February 24, 2007, for the 
registered monitors of ‘goo research’, a polling agency in Japan. The monitors’ ages 
ranged from 20 to 49 and their various occupations were (1) managers in a private 
company, (2) employees in an administrative position, (3) teachers, (4) lawyers, CPAs, 
and tax accountants, or (5) students in junior colleges, universities, or graduate schools1. 
The field experiment was conducted on the Internet. We sent emails that notified them 
of the URL at which the experiment would be conducted and 1033 monitors 
participated in the experiment2. When they logged onto the web site, they were 
randomly categorized into four groups }4,3,2,1{∈G . 
The following situation related to decision making under uncertainty was described 
to the participants in the experiment. There are two states of the world },{ BA∈ω  and 
each state is realized with the commonly known priors 2/1)Pr()Pr( == BA . Participants 
do not know which state will be realized. However, they can infer the state of the world 
by observing either a ‘private signal’ )(ωσ of which preciseness is 3/2)|)(Pr( =ωωσ  or 
other people’s predictions )(ωπ . The role of participant i  in group G  in this 
decision-making problem is to submit a prediction about which state will be realized 
                                                 
1 For details of participants’ demographic characteristics, see Table 1. 
2 They were paid 50 points (equivalent to 50 Japanese yen), which can be pooled and can be exchanged 
for a cash voucher in payment for participation. 
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t
Gi,)(ωΠ  and its subjective posterior probability t GiA ,)(μ  and t Git Gi AB ,, )(1)( μμ −=  in 
round nt ,...,1=  based on observed sequences of private signals or other people’s 
predictions. 
We define the process of this decision-making problem as individual learning or 
social learning depending on the difference in information they observe as follows. 
In the individual learning environment, participant i  in group G  submits 
t
Gi,)(ωΠ , t GiA ,)(μ  and t Git Gi AB ,, )(1)( μμ −=  after observing the sequence of private 
signals )(ωσ  for 1+=Gn  rounds. In round nt < , participant i  in group G  faces a 
question tGQA , which presents the private signal tA)(σ  and asks the participant to 
submit t Gi,)(ωΠ  and t GiA ,)(μ 3 . Thus, by question tGQA , the sequences of private 
signals that participants in groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 observed from all rounds except the 
final round were ))(( 1Aσ , ))(,)(( 21 AA σσ , ))(,)(,)(( 321 AAA σσσ , and 
))(,)(,)(,)(( 4321 AAAA σσσσ , respectively4. We name these sequences 1SA , 2SA , 3SA , 
and 4SA . On the other hand, in the final round nt = , participant i  in group G  faces 
a question nGQA , which presents the private signal nB)(σ  and asks the participant to 
submit nGi,)(ωΠ  and nGiA ,)(μ . Thus, by questions tGQA  and nGQA , the sequences of 
                                                 
3 Although participants were told that the computer program would automatically generate hints )(Aσ  
or )(Bσ  in each round based on the realized state, we presented a predetermined sequence of hints 
because we wanted to set up a situation where all the participants in each group observed the same 
sequence of hints. 
4 In round t , participants could also refer to the sequence of hints ))(,...,)(( 11 −tωσωσ  that they had 
already observed. 
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private signals that participants in groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 observed from all rounds were 
))(,)(( 21 BA σσ , ))(,)(,)(( 321 BAA σσσ , ))(,)(,)(,)(( 4321 BAAA σσσσ , and 
))(,)(,)(,)(,)(( 54321 BAAAA σσσσσ , respectively. We name these sequences 5SA , 6SA , 
7SA , and 8SA . Using these sequences of private signals, we designed an individual 
learning environment where participants in each group observed the agreeing private 
signals in round nt <  and observed the contradicting private signals in the final round 
nt =  as summarized in the third column of Table2. 
In the social learning environment, participant i  in group G  submits t Gi,)(ωΠ , 
t
GiB ,)(μ , and t Git Gi BA ,, )(1)( μμ −=  after observing the ‘artificial’ sequence of other 
people’s predictions )(ωπ  or private signals )(ωσ  for 1+=Gn  rounds5. In each 
round nt < , participant i  in group G  faces a question tGQB  that presents the other 
people’s predictions tB)(π  and asks the participant to submit t Gi,)(ωΠ  and t GiB ,)(μ 6. 
Thus, by question tGQB , the sequences of other people’s predictions that participants in 
                                                 
5 Participants were told that several other people had already answered the same question that the 
participant was about to answer and that they had submitted their predictions after observing their private 
signals or ‘their’ other people’s predictions in the same way as the participant would do. However, there 
were no ‘other people’ and no one had submitted predictions earlier than any participants. Instead, we 
presented ‘artificial’ sequences of other people’s predictions and private signals to participants because 
we wanted to set up a situation where all the participants in each group observed the same sequence of 
other people’s predictions and private signals. 
6 As in the individual learning environment, in round t , participants could also refer to the sequence of 
other people’s predictions ))(,...,)(( 11 −tωπωπ  that they had already observed. 
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groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 observed from all rounds except the final round were ))(( 1Bπ , 
))(,)(( 21 BB ππ , ))(,)(,)(( 321 BBB πππ , and ))(,)(,)(,)(( 4321 BBBB ππππ , respectively. 
We name these sequences 1SB , 2SB , 3SB , and 4SB . On the other hand, in the final 
round nt = , participant i  in group G  faces a question nGQB  that presents the 
private signal nA)(σ  and asks the participant to submit n Gi,)(ωΠ  and nGiB ,)(μ . Thus, 
by questions tGQB  and nGQB , the sequences of other people’s predictions and private 
signals that participants in groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 observed from all rounds are 
))(,)(( 21 AB σπ , ))(,)(,)(( 321 ABB σππ , ))(,)(,)(,)(( 4321 ABBB σπππ , and 
))(,)(,)(,)(,)(( 54321 ABBBB σπππ , respectively. We name these sequences 5SB , 6SB , 
7SB , and 8SB . Using these sequences of other people’s predictions and private signals, 
we designed a social learning environment where participants in each group observe 
other people’s agreeing predictions in round nt <  and observe the contradicting 
private signal in the final round nt = as summarized in the third column of Table 2. 
In explaining the general structure of the situation in the individual and the social 
learning environments defined above, we presented the following description to 
participants. We paraphrased the state of the world as the situation where one of the 
boxes, either A or B, contains a piece of paper and a private signal as a hint. 
“There are two boxes, A and B. One of the two boxes contains a piece of 
paper on which “You Win” is printed, but the other one contains nothing. 
The probability that Box A contains the piece of paper and that Box B 
contains it are 50% and 50%, respectively. You are not informed which box 
contains the piece of paper, but you can observe ‘hints’ or ‘other people’s 
predictions’. Your role is to submit a prediction about which box contains 
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the piece of paper and its probability for several rounds based on observed 
sequences of hints or other people’s predictions.” 
The question tGQA  is presented in the beginning of round t  as follows. 
“ tGQA  Hint: Box A  contains the piece of paper.  
Which box contains the piece of paper? Please submit your prediction. Then, 
estimate the probability that Box A contains the piece of paper and the 
probability that Box B contains the piece of paper and choose one of the 
combinations below that is the closest to your estimation. Note that this hint 
reports the correct answer with probability 2/3 and the incorrect answer with 
probability 1/3. Note also that the hints you observe may not always report 
the correct answer, but the box containing the piece of paper does not 
change from the first round to the final round.” 
After reading tGQA , participants submit t Gi,)(ωΠ  and t GiA ,)(μ  in each round7. 
Question tGQB  is presented in the beginning of round nt <  as follows, although 
question nGQB  is presented in exactly the same way as tGQA . 
“ tGQB  The other person st '#  prediction: Box B  contains the piece of 
paper.  
                                                 
7 Participants submit the prediction t Gi,)(ωΠ  by choosing one of the two buttons indicating ‘Box A’ and 
‘Box B’. Participants submit the subjective posteriors t GiA ,)(μ  and t Git Gi AB ,, )(1)( μμ −=  by 
choosing one of the 20 combinations of probabilities that “the probability that Box A contains the piece of 
paper” and “the probability that Box B contains the piece of paper” from 0% to 100% at 5% intervals. 
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Which box contains the piece of paper? Please submit your prediction. Then, 
estimate the probability that Box A contains the piece of paper and the 
probability that Box B contains it and choose one of the combinations below 
that is the closest to your estimation. Note that the other person t#  has 
submitted his/her prediction after observing other people’s predictions and 
hints in the same way as you do.” 
After reading tGQB , participants submit t Gi,)(ωΠ  and t GiB ,)(μ  in each round. 
3. Behavioral hypotheses 
In this section, we consider the belief-updating behavior by a rational Bayesian 
participant in an individual and a social learning environment. 
Let tGPB )(ω  be the Bayesian posterior belief that the state of the world ω  would 
be realized in round t  evaluated by participants in group }4,3,2,1{∈G . In the 
individual learning environment consisting of questions tGQA , each hint that 
participants observe is informative, so that they can update their posterior probability in 
a Bayesian way in each round. For example, if participant i  observes the sequence of 
hints ))(,...,)(( 1 tAA σσ , the posterior probability should be: 
)|)(,...,)(Pr()Pr()|)(,...,)(Pr()Pr(
)|)(,...,)(Pr()Pr())(,...,)(|Pr()( 11
1
1
BAABAAAA
AAAAAAAAPB tt
t
tt
G σσσσ
σσσσ +==
 
Given the sequence of hints we presented to participants, tGAPB )(  in each group at 
each round should be those summarized in the eighth column in Table 2.  
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For the prediction of the state )(ωΠ , participants except group 1 at round 2 should 
always submit )(AΠ because they observe more )(Aσ  than )(Bσ . 
However, in the social learning environment consisting of questions tGQB , other 
people’s predictions observed by participants in each round may not be informative if 
participants believe that other people update their beliefs in a Bayesian way as follows. 
Suppose that the other person in round 1 observes 1)(Bσ . Then, she would submit 
1
,1)( GBΠ  because her posterior belief is 3/2))(|Pr( 1 =BB σ . Having observed her 
prediction, if the other person in round 2 observes 2)(Bσ  he would submit his 
prediction 2,2)( GBΠ  because his posterior belief is 5/4))(,)(|Pr( 21 =BBB σπ . Having 
observed these predictions, the other person in round 3 would submit 3,3)( GBΠ  
whichever hint she observes because her posterior belief is 
9/8))(,)(,)(|Pr( 321 =BBBB σππ  if she observes 3)(Bσ  and 
3/2))(,)(,)(|Pr( 321 =ABBB σππ  if she observes 3)(Aσ . Because the other person in 
round 4 knows that the other person in round 3 always submits 3)(BΠ , her prediction 
does not convey any information about the state of the world. Thus, the other person in 
round 4 inevitably ignores the prediction by the other person in round 3 and he submits 
his prediction in exactly the same way as by the person in round 3. In this way, people 
after round 4 ignore their predecessors’ predictions and behave as if they were in round 
3 if the first two people’s predictions happen to correspond. Informational cascades, 
formulated by Bikhchandani et al. (1992), are said to occur if all the individuals in a 
society choose an identical action regardless of their private signals as a consequence of 
rational Bayesian belief updating. In our configuration of sequences of other people’s 
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predictions, 3)(Bπ  and 4)(Bπ  do not reflect 3)(Bσ  and 4)(Bσ . Thus, participants 
cannot update their posterior beliefs in the sequences 3SB , 4SB , 7SB , and 8SB , and 
informational cascades occur in these sequences. Specifically, their posterior beliefs 
t
GBPB )(  stay constant at 0.8 in the sequences 3SB  and 4SB , and stay constant at 0.67 
in the sequences 7SB  and 8SB , as summarized in the eighth column of Table 2. Note 
that in the sequences where informational cascades can occur, tGBPB )(  in the social 
learning environment is always lower than tGAPB )(  in the individual learning 
environment because participants no longer update their posterior beliefs. 
On the other hand, other people’s predictions are informative in the sequences where 
informational cascades cannot occur in the social learning environment because other 
people’s predictions should reflect their observed hints. Thus, participants update their 
posterior beliefs in 1SB  and 2SB . In addition, hints are always informative as in the 
case of the individual learning environment and participants update their posterior 
beliefs also in 5SB  and 6SB . In such sequences, tGBPB )(  in the social learning 
environment is the same as tGAPB )(  in the individual learning environment because 
participants can update their posterior beliefs in exactly the same way as in the 
individual learning environment. 
Given the sequence of other people’s predictions we presented to participants, 
t
GBPB )(  in each group at each round should be those summarized in the eighth column 
in Table 2.  
For the prediction of the state )(ωΠ , participants except group 1 at round 2 should 
always submit )(BΠ because they observe more )(Bπ  than )(Aσ . 
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4. Belief-updating behavior in an individual and a social learning environment 
From the predictions t Gi,)(ωΠ  and the subjective posterior beliefs t GiA ,)(μ  and 
t
GiB ,)(μ  that all participants in group G  had submitted for 1+=Gn  rounds in each of 
t
GQA  and tGQB , we collected data in a total of 16 different sequences. In this section, 
we examine whether participants’ belief-updating behaviors are consistent with the 
behavioral hypotheses by a rational Bayesian proposed in the previous section, and 
whether they differ depending on the learning environment. 
The sixth column of Table 2 reports the observed proportions of predictions t GiA ,)(Π  
and t GiB ,)(Π . When participants observed the agreeing hint, other people’s agreeing 
prediction, or the contradicting hint in the most recent round ( 81 ,..., SASA  and 
),... 41 SBSB , more than half of them submitted t GiA ,)(Π  ( t GiB ,)(Π ) for question tGQA  
( tGQB ). When participants observed other people’s contradicting prediction in the most 
recent round (from 5SB  to 8SB ), more than half of them submitted t GiA ,)(Π  for 
question tGQB , although they should have submitted t GiB ,)(Π  if they rationally update 
their posterior beliefs. These results are inconsistent with behavioral hypotheses by a 
rational Bayesian in that participants in tGQA  ( tGQB ), except group 1 at round 2, should 
always submit predictions t GiA ,)(Π  ( t GiB ,)(Π ). In the laboratory experiments on 
informational cascades, such Bayesian inconsistent behaviors are often observed. In fact, 
Anderson and Holt (1997), Dominitz and Hung (2004), and Hung and Plott (2001) 
found that not all subjects submitted t GiB ,)(Π  when they had observed exactly the same 
 11
sequence of the other people’s predictions and private signals as in 6SB  and 7SB
8. 
However, the proportions of t GiB ,)(Π  in their laboratory experiments are higher than 
those observed in our field experiment. 
For participants’ subjective posteriors, the average t GiA ,)(μ  increases as the number 
of tA)(σ  increases in tGQA  and the average t GiB ,)(μ  increases as the number of 
tB)(π  increases in tGQB  as summarized in the seventh column in Table 2. However, 
all of the observed average subjective posteriors are lower than the Bayesian posteriors 
t
GAPB )(  or tGBPB )(  derived in the previous section. The t-tests shown in the ninth 
column of Table 2 report that the observed differences between the average participants’ 
posteriors and the Bayesian posteriors are statistically significant in almost all 
sequences of hints and other people’s predictions. This result indicates that participants 
certainly use hints and other people’s predictions in their probabilistic inferences, but 
they cannot update their posterior beliefs as efficiently as Bayesian theory assumes even 
when they sequentially observe informative hints in the individual learning environment. 
In the laboratory experiments on informational cascades, Dominitz and Hung (2004), 
Sasaki and Kawagoe (2006), and Stiehler (2003) observed that participants’ posterior 
                                                 
8 Anderson and Holt (1997) reported that the proportion of t GiB ,)(Π  was 0.75 and 0.84 in the same 
sequence of 6SB  and 7SB . Dominitz and Hung (2004) reported that it was 0.52 and 0.80 in the same 
sequence of 6SB  and 7SB . Hung and Plott (2001) reported that it was 0.61 and 0.67 in the same 
sequence of 6SB  and 7SB . The preciseness of the private signal in their laboratory experiments is 
3/2)|)(Pr( =ωωσ , the same as the hints we used in our field experiment. 
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beliefs were lower than the Bayesian posteriors in the same sequence of 81 ,..., SBSB
9. 
However, as for the case of the proportion of t Gi,)(ωΠ , averages of t Gi,)(ωμ  observed 
in their laboratory experiments were higher than those observed in our field 
experiment10. 
The two cells between the bold lines in the seventh column of Table 2 compare 
participants’ average posterior beliefs in the same sequences of hints and other people’s 
predictions between the individual and the social learning environment. As we can see, 
the average posterior beliefs are higher in the individual learning environment ( tGQA ) 
than in the social learning environment ( tGQB ). The Wilcoxon matched pair sign rank 
tests shown in the right-most column of Table 2 report that the observed differences 
between the average posterior beliefs in the individual learning environment ( tGQA ) and 
                                                 
9 Dominitz and Hung (2004) reported that the average tB)(μ  was 0.61, 0.68, 0.74, and 0.78 in the 
same sequence of 1SB , 2SB , 3SB , and 4SB , respectively. Sasaki and Kawagoe (2006) reported that 
the average tB)(μ  was 0.49, 0.56, 0.58, and 0.59 in the same sequence of 5SB , 6SB , 7SB , and 
8SB , respectively, and Stiehler (2003) reported that the average
tB)(μ was 0.47, 0.58, 0.63 in the same 
sequence of 6SB , 7SB , and 8SB , respectively. The preciseness of the private information in Dominitz 
and Hung (2004) and in Sasaki and Kawagoe (2006) was 3/2)|)(Pr( =ωωσ , and in Stiehler (2003) 
was 5/3)|)(Pr( =ωωσ . 
10 These differences may reflect the different design and procedure between the laboratory experiment 
and the field experiment. Participants in a laboratory informational cascades experiment are typically paid 
according to the correctness of their predictions and posterior beliefs, whereas participants in our field 
experiment were paid regardless of the correctness of their predictions.  
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those in the social learning environment ( tGQB ) are statistically significant even in the 
sequences where t GiA ,)(μ  and t GiB ,)(μ  should be equal ( 1SA  and 1SB , 2SA  and 2SB , 
5SA  and 5SB , and 6SA  and 6SB ). 
This result indicates that participants rely more on their private signals than on other 
people’s actions even when the informativeness of both is identical. This is clear 
evidence of the existence of participants’ cognitive biases such as overconfidence on 
private signals or distrust of other people’s actions, which are frequently found in 
laboratory experiments on informational cascades (e.g., Anderson and Holt, 1997, and 
Nöth and Weber, 2003). These studies typically argue participants’ overconfidence on 
the grounds of their Bayesian inconsistent behavior in discrete choice problems. 
However, we argue that our result is more robust than theirs because we elicited all 
participants’ posterior beliefs in both the individual and the social learning 
environments and found that even the same participant, on average, submits higher 
posterior beliefs in the individual learning environment than in the social learning 
environment for all sequences. 
5. Participant’s trust in other people’s actions and their demographic 
characteristics 
We observed that participants, on average, do not trust other people’s predictions as 
much as their own private signals in the social learning environment. Then, what type of 
person is more likely to trust other people’s decisions in their probabilistic inferences? 
In this section, we measure each participant’s degree of trust in other people’s 
decisions and examine whether it is affected by their demographic characteristics.  
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We define tGt GitGi BPBBTRUST )()( ,, −= μ  as the degree of trust in other people’s 
decisions for participant i  at round t  by using the data of posterior beliefs that each 
participant submitted in each sequence of the tGQB  questions. Note that tGiTRUST ,  is 
positive if participant i  trusts other people’s predictions and puts too much weight on 
t
Bπ , and is negative if she distrusts them and puts too much weight on tAσ , compared to 
t
GBPB )(
11. 
From the data on participants’ demographic characteristics, we consider participant 
i ’s age ( iAGE ), his/her gender (a dummy variable iMALE , which equals 1 if 
participant i  is male and 0 otherwise), his/her educational background (a dummy 
variable iDEG  which equals 1 if participant i  has (or is expected to have) a 
university degree and 0 otherwise). For occupational variables, we use iMAN , which 
equals 1 if participant i  is a manager in a private company and 0 otherwise, iADMIN , 
which equals 1 if participant i is an employee in an administrative position and 0 
otherwise, iTEA , which equals 1 if participant i  is a teacher and 0 otherwise, and 
iLAW , which equals 1 if participant i  is a lawyer, a CPA, or a tax accountant and 0 
otherwise. We pooled data for tGiTRUST ,  where participants submitted the posterior 
beliefs t GiB ,)(μ  in each round for eight different sequences ( 81 ,..., SBSB ). Then, we 
                                                 
11 We can check that averages of tGiTRUST , in all sequence ( 81 ,...SBSB ) are negative by looking at the 
values of tB)(μ and tGBPB )(  in Table 2 as we have confirmed that participants, on average, distrust 
other people’s actions in the previous section. 
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regressed tGiTRUST ,  against iAGE , iMALE , iDEG , iMAN , iADMIN , iTEA , and 
iLAW  using the random effects model. 
Table 3 reports the result of the regression. The estimated coefficient of iMALE  is 
significantly positive, suggesting that male participants are more likely to trust other 
people’s decisions than female participants. For the occupational variables, the 
estimated coefficients of iMAN , iADMIN , and iLAW  are significantly negative. 
Because we do not use a dummy variable for students, we argue that managers in a 
private company, employees in an administrative position, and lawyers, CPAs, and tax 
accountants are more likely than students to distrust other people’s decisions. 
6. Participant’s conformity to other people’s actions and their demographic 
characteristics 
In this section, we measure participant’s conformity to other people’s decisions and 
examine whether it is influenced by their degree of trust in other people’s decisions and 
their demographic characteristics.  
To do this, we consider a situation where participants make decisions on the same 
problems with and without reference to other people’s decision making. If participant i  
makes an arbitrary decision when he cannot refer to other people’s decisions, but makes 
the same decision as that chosen by some influential people when he can refer to their 
decisions, we regard such decisions as conformity to other people’s decisions. 
A series of questions in QC  are developed to investigate whether participants’ 
decisions on an uncertain event are influenced by authoritative people in the social 
learning environment. Participants were asked to predict which movie would win the 
79th Academy Award 2007 with and without reference to the result of the 64th Golden 
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Globe Award 2007, which is one of the most prestigious movie awards in the world12. If 
participant i  chooses a nonawarded movie if he/she cannot refer to the result of the 
Golden Globe Award and chooses the awarded movie if he/she can refer to it, we regard 
this participant as conforming to the authoritativeness of the award. 
First, in 1−QC , we asked participants: “Which film will win the Best Picture award 
in the 79th Academy Award 2007 among the following nominees: ‘The Departed’, 
‘Babel’, ‘Letters from Iwo Jima’, ‘Little Miss Sunshine’, or ‘The Queen’?” 
Second, in 2−QC , we asked participants: “‘Babel’ won the Best Motion 
Picture—Drama award in the 64th Golden Globe Award 2007, which is often considered 
the preliminaries for the Academy Award. Which film will win the Best Picture award 
in the 79th Academy Award 2007 among the following nominees: ‘The Departed’, 
‘Babel’, ‘Letters from Iwo Jima’, ‘Little Miss Sunshine’, or ‘The Queen’? We asked 
you the same question in 1−QC , but you can choose either the same or a different 
answer based on how you feel right now.” 
From the answers to these questions we define the variable iOSCAR , which equals 1 
if participant i  chooses anything other than “Babel” in 1−QC  and “Babel” in 
2−QC  and 0 otherwise 13 . Then, we regress iOSCAR  against tGiTRUST , , iAGE , 
                                                 
12 Note that the answers to the questions in the experiment were accepted until February 24th, 2007, the 
day before the Academy Award ceremony. No participants knew the results of the Academy Award. 
13 Of course, some of the participant would know the result of the Golden Globe Award or they could 
look it up before answering 1−QC . Such participants might not change their answers between 
1−QC and 2−QC . However, the proportion of participants who chose “Babel” increases from 
1−QC  to 2−QC  as summarized in Table 4.1. 
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iMALE , iDEG , iMAN , iADMIN , iTEA , and iLAW  using the random effects logit 
model. The result of the regression is shown in the second and third columns of Table 5. 
The estimated coefficient of tGiTRUST ,  is significantly positive. We argue that the 
participants who relatively trusted other people’s decisions in tGQB  are more likely to 
conform to authoritative people’s decisions. The estimated coefficient of iAGE  is 
significantly positive and that of iMALE  is significantly negative, implying that older 
and female participants are more likely to conform to authoritative people’s decisions. 
For the occupational variables, the coefficients of iMAN , iADMIN , and iLAW  are 
significantly negative. Thus, we argue that participants working in these occupations are 
less likely to conform than students. 
A series of questions in QD  are developed to investigate whether participants’ 
preferences are influenced by other people in the social learning environment. 
Participants were asked to answer whether they support the Abe cabinet in Japan with 
and without reference to various opinion polls. If participant i  changes his/her answer 
in accordance with the representative result of opinion polls if he/she can refer to them, 
we regard such participants as conforming to other people’s preferences. 
First, in 1−QD , we asked participants: “Do you support the Abe cabinet?” 
Second, in 2−QD , we presented the results of four opinion polls, which show a 
decline in the approval rates of the Abe cabinet from 63%–70% to 39–51% in four 
months. Then, we asked participants: “The figure below shows changes in the approval 
rates of the Abe cabinet from four opinion polls. As you can see, the approval rates of 
the Abe cabinet have declined from September 2006 when the Abe cabinet was 
inaugurated. Do you support the Abe cabinet? We asked you the same question in 
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1−QD , but you can choose either the same answer or a different answer. Please make 
your decision based on how you feel right now.” 
From the answers to these questions we define the variable iCABINET , which equals 
1 if participant i  answered “I support the Abe cabinet” in 1−QD  and answered “I do 
not support the Abe cabinet” in 2−QD  and 0 otherwise 14 . Then, we regress 
iCABINET  against tGiTRUST , , iAGE , iMALE , iDEG , iMAN , iADMIN , iTEA , and 
iLAW  using the random effects logit model. The results of the regression are shown in 
the fourth and fifth columns of Table 5. 
The estimated coefficient of tGiTRUST ,  is significantly positive. We argue that the 
participants who relatively trusted other people’s decisions in tGQB  are more likely to 
conform to other people’s preferences. The estimated coefficients of iAGE  and iDEG  
are significantly negative, implying that older and educated participants are less likely 
to conform. The estimated coefficients of iMAN , iADMIN , and iTEA  are significantly 
positive; thus we argue that participants working in these occupations are more likely to 
conform than students. 
Although the degree of trust in other people’s decisions in tGQB  positively 
affects the conformity in both questions of QC  and QD , effects of participants’ 
demographic characteristics on the conformity are not consistent for these two questions. 
In order to explain this inconsistency, we may have to consider the possibility that the 
conformity in QC  and QD  is caused by different mechanisms. In the literature of 
                                                 
14 The proportion of participants choosing “not support” increases from 1−QD  to 2−QD  as 
summarized in Table 4.2. 
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social psychology, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) distinguished two types of social 
influence which causes the conformity. They refer to the informational social influence 
as the influence “to accept information obtained from another as evidence about 
reality.” They also refer to the normative social influence as the influence “to conform 
with the positive expectations of another.” InQC , if participants make use of the result 
of the Golden Globe Award in predicting which movie would win the Academy Award, 
we can interpret that their conformity is caused by the informational social influence. 
On the other hand in QD , if participants feel that they should comply with other people 
after recognizing the fact that many other people do not support the Abe cabinet, we can 
interpret that their conformity is caused by the normative social influence. 
7. Concluding remarks 
This study examines belief-updating behavior in individual and social learning 
environments. We found that participants certainly use the sequences of private signals 
and other people’s predictions in their probabilistic inferences, but they cannot update 
their posterior belief as efficiently as Bayesian theory assumes because their posterior 
beliefs are always lower than Bayesian posteriors even when they sequentially observe 
informative private signals in the individual learning environment. In addition, the 
posterior beliefs that participants submitted in the individual learning environment are 
always higher than those in the social learning environment even when the 
informativeness of the sequences of private signals and other people’s predictions is 
exactly the same. This observation is a clear evidence of participants’ overconfidence 
on their own private signals or distrust of other people’s actions. Furthermore, we 
confirmed that participant’s trust in other people’s actions is affected by their 
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demographic characteristics. For the analysis of participant’s conformity, although their 
trust in other people’s actions positively affects the conformity for the two different 
situations, effects of participants’ demographic characteristics on the conformity are not 
consistent between them. In order to explain this inconsistency, we need further 
investigation on the mechanism how different social influences cause the conformity in 
the social learning environment as Deutsche and Gerard (1955) pointed out. 
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Table 1. Participants’ demographic characteristics 
Characteristics  Observations 
Gender Male 
Female 
678 (65.63%) 
355 (34.37%) 
Age 20–29 
30–39 
40–49 
506 (48.98%) 
197 (19.09%) 
330 (31.95%) 
Occupation Managers in private company 
Employees in an administrative position 
Teachers 
Lawyers, CPAs, Tax accountants 
Students in junior colleges, universities, or 
graduate schools 
125 (12.10%) 
173 (16.75%) 
143 (13.84%) 
12 (1.16%) 
479 (46.37%) 
Educational 
Background 
Junior high school (graduated) 
High school (dropped out) 
High school (graduated) 
Junior college (dropped out) 
Junior college (graduated or will graduate) 
University (dropped out) 
University (graduated or will graduate) 
Graduate school – Master’s course (dropped out) 
Graduate school – Masters’ course (graduated or 
will graduate) 
Graduate school – Doctoral course (dropped out) 
Graduate school – Doctoral course (graduated or 
will graduate) 
Not answered 
2 (0.19%) 
6 (0.58%) 
104 (10.07%) 
5 (0.48%) 
76 (7.36%) 
35 (3.39%) 
617 (59.73%) 
5 (0.48%) 
121 (11.71%) 
 
11 (1.08%) 
41 (3.97%) 
 
10 (0.97%) 
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Table 2. Proportion of t Gi,)(ωΠ , average t Gi,)(ωμ , tGPB )(ω , and results of tests 
 
 25
Table 3. Participant’s trust in other people’s actions and their demographic 
characteristics 
Dependent variable tGiTRUST ,  p>|z| 
iAGE  0.1385 0.180 
iMALE  3.1803 0.010 
iDEG  1.1803 0.375 
iMAN  –4.3092 0.086 
iADMIN  –5.1482 0.032 
iTEA  0.0099 0.962 
iLAW  –9.0024 0.078 
Constant –23.8344 0.000 
Number of observations 3577 
Number of participants 1023 
R2 0.0125 
Wald Chi2(7) 18.48 
Prob>Chi2 0.0100 
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Table 4.1. The proportion of answers in 1−QC  and 2−QC  
Answers 1−QC  2−QC  
Babel 0.2197 0.3359 
The Departed 0.0949 0.0842 
Letters from Iwo Jima 0.5537 0.4695 
Little Miss Sunshine 0.0697 0.0591 
The Queen 0.0620 0.0513 
Table 4.2. The proportion of answers in 1−QD  and 2−QD  
Answers 1−QD  2−QD  
Support 0.3040 0.2865
Not support 0.6960 0.7135
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Table 5. Participant’s conformity to other people’s actions and their demographic 
characteristics 
Dependent variable iOSCAR  p>|z| iCABINET  p>|z| 
t
GiTRUST ,  0.0086 0.096 0.020 0.028 
iAGE  0.0420 0.094 –0.1651 0.000 
iMALE  –0.6217 0.036 –0.0952 0.846 
iDEG  –0.5032 0.125 –1.0434 0.022 
iMAN  –1.9746 0.001 2.7566 0.003 
iADMIN  –1.5848 0.007 3.2674 0.000 
iTEA  –0.2725 0.590 1.9052 0.015 
iLAW  –2.0570 0.062 –17.8440 1.000 
Constant –3.5477 0.000 –1.5717 0.131 
Number of 
observations 
3577 3577 
Number of 
participants 
1023 1023 
Wald Chi2(8) 35.44 28.81 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0003 
 
 
